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ABSTRACT
Global pandemic Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has serious harmful
effects on our day-to-day lives. To overcome challenges such as this, critical
preparedness, readiness, and response actions are required. This thesis uses estimates of
community resilience available through the CRE Tool, published by the US Census
Bureau, and COVID19 cases published by John Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center
for Idaho counties. Simple linear regression analysis was performed to identify a
correlation between COVID-19 cases and deaths in Idaho counties and measures of their
resilience. Understanding this correlation could lead to better estimation and prediction
of the effect of disasters in Idaho’s counties.
We determined that there is a weak negative correlation exists between the
number of COVID-19 cases and the percentage of people who fall into low-risk
categories, a weak positive correlation between the number of cases and the percentage
of people who fall into medium-risk categories. We also determined that there is a
moderate positive correlation between the number of deaths and the percentage of people
in a high-risk category. Analysis of the residuals requires further study.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The common symptoms of COVID-19 include fever, dry
cough, difficulty in breathing, etc. While most cases result in mild to moderate
symptoms, some progress to pneumonia, multi-organ failure, and even death. The
COVID-19 pandemic makes up a global health shock, with a death toll of over 6.2
million and over 500 million people reported ill by 29 March 2022. The rapidly
increasing number of COVID-19 cases represents an unprecedented public health
challenge for federal, state, and local authorities. Given the need to control the spread of
the virus, the evolving guidelines for front-line providers, institution and business
closures, and social distancing have been highly disruptive to essential healthcare,
economic activities, and social services, leading to a significant increase in individual and
community stress.
As the number of cases of COVID-19 increases, so does the associated anxiety.
Disaster situations and traumatic events overwhelm our ability to cope. While this longterm disease is still ongoing, and we still have no idea when this will end, it is possible to
mitigate some consequences by measuring communities’ vulnerability and resilience.
Community resilience can play a significant role in coping with shocks. However, it is an
ambiguous concept, hard to define and measure. We define it as a complex and dialogical
process in which communities create, develop and engage their resources to cope with
shocks and their consequent uncertainty [23].
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1.1

Background

Coronavirus disease was first reported as an outbreak of respiratory illness cases
in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China, in late December 2019. Later, WHO named the
novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 in February 2020. In addition, the United States
reported its first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus in January 2020. This virus has
many potential naturals, intermediate, and final hosts (Fig. 1.1); due to these
characteristics, there is a great challenge in preventing and treating the virus infection.
The high infectivity and transmissibility make this disease a pandemic. And within a few
months, researchers, manufacturers, organizations, media, and governments worldwide
collaborate to gather and evaluate the COVID-19 data to predict and slow down the
pandemic at any cost. WHO published healthcare, technical, preparedness and response,
and social guidelines and then advised countries on responding suitably in the situations.
Then, the first U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved vaccine was
available in August 2021, which was a milestone against the pandemic. Preventive
measures for COVID-19 also include testing, isolating, maintaining social distancing,
washing hands frequently, and avoiding touching the mouth, nose, and face.
1.2

Problem Statement

In this thesis, we focus on the community resilience of Idaho counties regarding
COVID19 confirmed cases and confirmed deaths. Our objective is to use linear
regression to identify the relationship between the community resilience data and the
COVID-19 case data for 44 Idaho counties. An understanding of these relationships has
the potential to predict and forecast how communities will respond to an epidemic.
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Figure 1.1

Transmission of COVID-19 [40]

Our research objectives focus on the following questions.
1. How is resilience defined?
2. What is community disaster resilience, and how can it be incorporated in the
COVID19 pandemic in particular?
3. How reliable is the proposed CRE tool, available through the U.S. Census
Bureau, as a quantitative measure of how well counties in Idaho responded to
the COVID-19 pandemic?
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CHAPTER 2: COMMUNITY DISASTER RESILIENCE
In this chapter, we review the concepts of community disaster resilience to form a
better understanding of community resilience for a recent worldwide disaster, the
COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, this chapter provides a theoretical foundation for
developing the conceptual framework and relevance for measuring resilience discussed in
Chapter 3.
2.1

Resilience

A system is usually designed to behave in a certain way under normal
circumstances. However, when disturbed from equilibrium by a disruptive event, the
performance of the system will deviate from its design level. The resilience of the system
is its ability to reduce both the magnitude and duration of the deviation as efficiently as
possible to its usual targeted system performance levels. Fig. 2.1 shows how a system
returns to its normal equilibrium position after the disturbance occurs [36].
The term “resilience” was initially used in physics and mathematics to describe
the capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement. Today,
resilience has emerged in many wide-ranging diverse disciplines, including hazards,
ecology, psychology, sociology, geography, economics, urban planning, and public
health [28, 27]. As a concept, resilience thinking can be found anywhere from self-help
guides on coping with hardships to major international agendas on reducing impacts from
climatic change and is defined in various ways depending on the discipline. However,
when applied to people and their environments, “resilience” is fundamentally a metaphor.
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Figure 2.1

How a system returns to normal performance equilibrium position
[36]

In recent years, the term ’resilience’ has gained increasing attention in the field of
hazards and disasters. However, with its growing use in increasingly diverse areas,
scholarly and policy prominence has come a fair amount of conceptual confusion and
misapplication. So then, what does ‘resilience’ actually mean? Our primary focus is to
identify key concepts and explores the relevance of resilience for disaster planning for
communities. Resilience is a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive
trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance [28]. Government, industry,
and charitable organizations have an increasing focus on programs intended to support
community resilience to disasters. Most definitions of resilience share four common
elements: context; disturbance; capacity; and reaction, shown in Fig 2.2 [17].
But has consensus been reached on what defines ’community resilience’ and its
core characteristics?
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Figure 2.2

Four elements of resilience defined by the Department for
International Development [17]

2.2

Community resilience

Communities are complex entities, and the challenges they face in this 21st
century are getting complicated. For example, human-caused and natural disasters are
more frequent and cost more modern lives [22]. In addition, factors like climate change,
globalization, and increased urbanization can bring disaster-related risks to more
significant numbers of people. Addressing these threats, we need to be well prepared for
upcoming unknown disasters by gathering all the known experiences and taking proper
actions to secure our human society.
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Community resilience can play a vital role in coping with shocks. However, the
concept of “community resilience” raises the same concerns as the concept of resilience
per se but is further complicated by variation in the meaning of community. Typically, a
community is an entity that has geographic boundaries and shared fate. Communities are
composed of built, natural, social, and economic environments that complexly influence
one another. Past writings on community resilience have described everything from
grass-roots groups and neighborhoods to complex amalgams of formal institutions and
sectors in larger geopolitical units. This description is not inappropriate, as resilience can
be understood and addressed at different levels of analysis. However, discussions of
community resilience often note that the “whole is more than the sum of its parts,”
meaning that a collection of individual resilience does not guarantee a resilient
community [28].
The U.S. Census Bureau defines: “Community resilience is a measure of the
capacity of individuals and households to absorb, endure, and recover from the health,
social, and economic impacts of a disaster such as a hurricane or pandemic. When
disasters occur, recovery depends on the community’s ability to withstand the effects of
the event”[5]. To define community resilience, Paton said it is important to identify the
personal and community characteristics and processes that promote a capability to
“bounce back” and effectively use physical and economic resources to aid recovery
following exposure to hazard activity. Resilience should be conceptualized and managed
in a contingent rather than a prescriptive manner. Researchers, planners, and emergency
managers must acknowledge heterogeneity in community characteristics and perceptual
processes and develop models that accommodate contingent relationships between hazard
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effects and community, cultural, geographical, and temporal factors within resilience
models[35].
Community resilience is a process linking a set of networked adaptive capacities
to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation in constituent populations after a
disturbance. Community resilience describes the capability (or process) of a community
adapting and functioning in the face of disturbance [28]. Communities and individuals
harness local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency in a way that
complements the response of the emergency services [6].
From a literature review of Patel and colleagues [34], three general types of
definition were found:
1. process i.e. an ongoing process of change and adaptation
2. absence of adverse effect i.e. an ability to maintain stable functioning and
3. range of attributes i.e. a broad collection of response-related abilities
More recent studies tended to adopt the first type of definition 1. Community
resilience is defined as “a reflection of people’s shared and unique capacities to manage
and adaptively respond to the extraordinary demands on resources and the losses
associated with disasters” [35] [28][12]. Furthermore, community resilience is defined as
“a capability (or process) of a community adapting and functioning in the face of
disturbance” [8].
The absence of adverse effect definition 2 uses the desired outcome of
’maintaining stable functioning’ as their basis. Contrasting to the first type of definition,
Gibson [18] stated that “...resilience is not a process, it is not a management system
standard, nor is it a consulting product. Instead, resilience is a demonstrable outcome of
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an organization’s capability to cope with uncertainty and change in an often volatile
environment. Resilience is thus a product of an organization’s capabilities interacting
with its environment.
This notion of community resilience as an outcome was adapted by others who
noted the importance of explicitly identifying and strengthening abilities in a community,
creating definition 3. An example of these definitions can be found in which community
resilience is defined as “communities and individuals harnessing local resources and
expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that complements the response of
the emergency services” [6]. This report suggests that primarily, community resilience
has to do with having a responsive and collective action of local support to help the
community after/during an incident. “A community’s capacities, skills, and knowledge
that allows the community to participate fully in the recovery from disasters” [28] is
called community resilience. Additionally, definitions exist that blend one or more of
these general definition types. In a recent review, Ostad Taghizadeh and colleagues [33]
produced a definition that blended definition 2 and 3, now used by the United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDDR): the “ability of a system, community, or
society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects
of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner including through the preservation and
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.”
Therefore, community resilience was an amorphous concept that different
research groups understood and applied differently to different communities. In essence,
community resilience can either be seen as an ongoing process of adaptation, the simple
absence of adverse effects, the presence of a range of positive attributes, or a mixture of
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all three [34]. Unfortunately, we currently have no consensus on what exactly a culture or
community should look like to be more resilient. Until we resolve this fundamental
question, attempts to measure or enhance resilience will remain discordant and
inefficient, while the academic literature will continue to be confused by papers assessing
different concepts but using the same terminology. However, now that we have grown
some concept of community resilience, we will address the question of what community
resilience means in the context of disaster?
2.3

Community resilience in a disaster

The word disaster is used in diverse ways, primarily to refer to any sudden,
unexpected or extraordinary misfortune, regardless of the number of people, region,
country, or the entire world. In the disaster context, resilience is often treated as the
simple inverse of fragility [36].
At present, definitions of community disaster resilience tend to either focus on
specific aspects of the concept that may lead to overlooking some elements or tend
towards all encompassing definitions that may be too complex to apply at the local level.
It may be more appropriate to consider community resilience as a term for the range of
elements that may be important for a community facing or recovering from a disaster.
Resilience is now a key element of the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction(UNISDR), defining it as ‘the ability of a system, community or society
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions...is determined by the degree to
which the community has the necessary resources and is capable of organizing itself both
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before and during times of need’ [27]. In conceptual terms, vulnerability and disaster
resilience are closely related. Some researchers see vulnerability as the opposite of
disaster resilience, while others view vulnerability as a risk factor and disaster resilience
as the capacity to respond [24]. While labeling an individual or group of individuals as
“vulnerable” seems to discourage peoples’ efforts in dealing with disasters, the concept
of community disaster resilience appears to be more proactive. It encourages collective
efforts in a community to deal with disasters.
Community disaster resilience is a broader concept that encompasses a large part
of the risk spectrum [42]. It emphasizes the community’s capacities and how to
strengthen them, and it places less emphasis on the factors which make the community
vulnerable. Some researchers see resilience as “a multi-dimensional attribute that in its
different forms contributes in various but equally important ways to disaster recovery”
[11].
The literature review indicates that conceptual and methodological problems still
exist concerning community disaster resilience that needs to be addressed. The concept of
disaster resilience seems to be central to understanding the complex interactions within
and across communities and how communities respond and function during disasters.
Researchers agree that disaster resilience is the capacity or ability of people, a group of
people, a community, or a society to continue functioning in the face of a disaster, the
ability of a system to absorb, resist or deflect disaster impact and when impacted to
relatively quickly recover and learn or adapt to future risks [25]. In general, we can
define that community disaster resilience describes a community’s intrinsic capacity to
resist and recover from a disaster or disturbance, capacity to adapt to crises.
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Developing community resilience helps disaster planners and community
members to build traditional preparedness while promoting robust community systems
and addressing the many factors contributing to health. In addition, a resilience approach
adds features like building social communication and improving the community systems’
everyday health and overall wellness.
2.4

Community resilience in the context of COVID-19

Worldwide, basic knowledge of COVID-19 across populations is now expected –
including knowledge about COVID-19 symptoms. Available global data suggests that
64% of survey participants could correctly describe COVID-19 signs and symptoms [38].
Risk perception is a crucial driver of behaviors, and there is growing evidence that
people’s risk perception of COVID-19 infection is declining. People are becoming
complacent; thus, risk perceptions are lowering. People feel less confident in what they
can do to control the virus. People do recognize COVID-19 as a serious disease;
however, they often feel COVID-19 is more of a threat to others: their friends and family,
their community and country, than to themselves [30]. Understanding the transmission of
this highly contagious disease, shown in Fig 1.1, is vital in the sense of control and
preventing the spread of the virus, as well as reducing community transmission and being
supportive of the affected people of our society.
People’s behavior and their willingness to follow public health and social
measures remain the most powerful weapons to stop spreading the virus. However,
human behavior is complex. Therefore, it is crucial for risk management to understand
people’s changing perceptions and attitudes and the barriers and enablers influencing
their ability and motivation to adopt and sustain positive health behaviors. Multiple
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efforts are made to collect, analyze, and use socio-behavioral evidence in response to this
pandemic. Consequently, there is an unprecedented need to elevate community resilience
to mitigate the impact of pandemics. People have enough knowledge about COVID-19
and the necessary preventive measures. However, as the situation continues, ’pandemic
fatigue’ is occurring. This fatigue is likely to lead to a decrease in people’s motivation to
follow recommended preventive behaviors and create a number of detrimental emotions,
experiences, and perceptions [32]. However, community-led approaches are championed
widely, resulting in increased trust and social cohesion and ultimately a reduction in the
negative impacts of COVID-19.
Pandemic fatigue can be influenced by a variety of factors depending on the
context. These factors include a decrease in risk perceptions related to the disease; an
increase in the socio-economic and psychological impact of the crisis and restrictions; the
urge for self-control and self-determination in a constantly changing and restricting
environment; and the feeling of getting used to the situation. Self-efficacy is a vital driver
of behavior change towards stronger community participation. In countries where people
feel less confident in their ability to protect themselves, people are also less likely to
practice preventive measures [20]· Social perceptions have consequences. They can
hamper efforts to stop or slow the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its impacts.
Community engagement and participation have played a critical role in successful disease
control and elimination campaigns in many countries [2], including outbreaks that
occurred previous to COVID-19 [19], [4]. That is, people-centered and community-led
approaches are championed widely, resulting in increased trust and social cohesion and
ultimately a reduction in the negative impacts of COVID-19.
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According to Giamberardino et al., 2020 [14], it took about 18 months for an
infectious disease to spread throughout the world in the nineteenth century. It took less
than 36 hours in recent years, which is shorter than the incubation period of most
diseases. Also, nearly 400 million people go to another country or region every year,
which undoubtedly accelerates the spread of the virus. The global outbreak of COVID-19
is a non-linear and dynamic process.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster that combines a biological threat with
various vulnerabilities, such as physical, social, and economic. Various attempts have
been made in the last years to study the spread of epidemic diseases, and the main
problem is to understand and describe the modalities of the geographic spread among
nations with different community characteristics and health statuses and the effects of
migration phenomena. Governments have taken health, social and economic measures to
address the emergency and reduce the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable. Most
of the countries in the region have made notable efforts, considering their reduced fiscal
space.
2.5

Summary

The concept of community resilience is widely used in the academic and policy
literature, yet the meanings of the term differ. Nevertheless, these core elements have
been consistently suggested as constituting community resilience as it applies to
disasters: local knowledge, community networks and relationships, communication,
health, governance and leadership, resources, economic investment, preparedness, and
mental outlook. Further exploration of these individual elements may lead to a greater
understanding of community resilience and how it can be measured and enhanced for the
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worldwide pandemic Covid-19. In the meantime, the attempt to define the concept of
community resilience would be unhelpful if it obscures the main point- being resilient as
a community when a disaster occurs.
The definitions and various concepts reviewed in this chapter provide a better
understanding of resilience, community resilience and how they should be conceptualized
and applied in the research for pandemic Covid-19. Only by understanding the character
of a community adequately, i.e., their communication and collaboration skills,
knowledge, needs, and gaps in understanding about COVID-19, can we achieve a
community-driven response that will reduce the spread of the virus and create a disasterresilient community.
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CHAPTER 3: COMMUNITY RESILIENCE DATA
This chapter discusses the importance of creating a tool to measure community
disaster resilience problems associated with creating an effective tool and highlights the
applications of the tools in specific fields. Then it introduces a newly developed
experimental estimate, Community Resilience Estimates (CRE) tool, developed by the
U.S. Census Bureau. To understand this tool, we reviewed concepts of resilience,
community resilience, community resilience for disaster, and COVID-19 from the
literature to identify key elements that can be used to validate the tool.
Public health emergencies in the United States have been complex, frequent, and
increasingly costly in the past decade. Emergencies are not always predictable, and
adequate resources are not always available to prepare in advance when a new threat
emerges [9]. Communities in Idaho rely on self-governance and state fund allocation to
combat natural disasters, diseases, and everyday life. Improved readiness can mitigate the
impact of disasters on at-risk populations and the economic burden on individuals,
households, and governments. However, often it can be difficult to fully understand
which areas are most at risk for these unexpected events. Therefore, it is vital to find a
metric to identify at-risk populations and adequately allocate resources to those
communities. Identifying the generic principles, i.e., risk factors, that support resilience
can facilitate the development of models capable of use with diverse communities and
hazards as well as provide emergency managers with a framework within which they can
develop suitable strategies tailored to the specific context (e.g., a mix of hazard and
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community characteristics). Resilience variables must have predictive validity
independent of the community or hazard under investigation to be useful for emergency
planning.
The U.S. Census Bureau has completed an analysis that classifies counties based
on their community resilience. The Bureau is the nation’s leading provider of quality data
with advanced statistical capabilities about its people and economy and is uniquely
positioned to provide the most accurate and timely measures for an individually focused
community resilience indicator. It uses detailed demographic and economic data about
individuals to build these estimates, with lower sampling error, compared to other
institutions. In addition, the Bureau can adapt the estimates as needed to incorporate the
latest and most relevant data. As a result, the Bureau produces estimates with the most
granularity, highest statistical quality, and broadest coverage while still protecting
privacy.
The U.S. Census Bureau has created a tool to help measure the degree of a
community’s resilience in the face of disasters and other emergencies in June 2020. This
newly developed experimental estimate, Community Resilience Estimates (CRE), is a
resilience measure that identifies a community’s ability to endure, respond and recover
from the impact of disasters. This tool can be used for any purpose where specific risk
factors are helpful at low levels of geography, i.e., by county. The CRE tool estimates
community resilience to disasters using small area estimation (SAE) techniques to
combine data from several sources and produce high-quality estimates. These techniques
are flexible and can easily be modified for a broad range of uses (hurricanes, tornadoes,
floods, economic recovery, etc.). Resilience to a disaster is partly determined by the
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vulnerabilities within a community. The Bureau designed population estimates based on
individual and household-level risk factors to measure these vulnerabilities and construct
the community resilience estimates.
Community resilience does not necessarily improve when they are able to cope
with disasters and their aftermath alone; rather, it improves when public health systems
strengthen protective factors such as social networks that aid people and communities to
manage, adapt, and ultimately recover well from disasters. Indeed, a good measure of
resilience implies that communities’ day-to-day health and wellbeing can help reduce the
negative impacts of disasters and being a member of multiple social networks or groups
can affect health and wellbeing, particularly during times of change. Therefore,
strengthening community resilience in the months and years will require a whole system
approach working with different sectors. The updated version of the CRE tool (updated
on August 2021) is produced using the information on individuals and households from
the 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) and the Census Bureau’s Population
Estimates Program (PEP) to identify the population most at risk of the Coronavirus
pandemic.
The ACS is a nationally representative survey with data on the characteristics of
the U.S. population. The sample is selected from all counties and county-equivalents and
has a sample size of about 3.5 million housing units each year. It is the premier source for
detailed population and housing information about the U.S. and communities within it.
The estimates analyze the individual, and household level restricted ACS microdata to
determine the number of individual risk factors. The PEP produces and publishes
estimates of the population living at a given time within a geographic entity in the U.S.
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and Puerto Rico. The estimates use population data from the PEP by tract, age group,
race and ethnicity, and sex. Once the weighted estimates are tabulated, small area
modeling techniques are utilized to create the CRE tool.
Resilience is measured using risk factors. Risk factors are determined by
examining the following ten demographic, socioeconomic, and housing characteristics in
the ACS. Risk factors are binary components that add up to 10 possible risks. For
household-level variables, if the household meets the criteria for the risk flag, every
individual in the household receives that risk flag. Risk Factors (R.F.) for Households
(H.H.) and Individuals (I) are:
•

R.F. 1: Income-to-Poverty Ratio (IPR) < 130 percent (H.H.)

•

R.F. 2: Single or zero caregiver household - only one or no individuals living
in the household age 18-64 (H.H.)

•

R.F. 3: Unit-level crowding defined as > 0.75 persons per room (HH)

•

R.F. 4: Communication barrier defined as either -Limited English speaking
households (H.H.) or; no one in the household over the age of 16 with a high
school diploma (H.H.)

•

R.F. 5: No one in the household is employed full-time, year-round. The flag is
not applied if all household residents are aged 65 years or older (H.H.)

•

R.F. 6: Disability posing constraint to significant life activity - Persons who
report having any one of the six disability types (I): hearing difficulty, vision
difficulty, cognitive difficulty, ambulatory difficulty, self-care difficulty, and
independent living difficulty

•

R.F. 7: No health insurance coverage (I)
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•

R.F. 8: Being aged 65 years or older (I)

•

R.F. 9: Households without a vehicle (H.H.)

•

R.F. 10: Households without broadband Internet access (H.H.)

Note that risk factor four is not double flagged. For example, if a household is
linguistically isolated and no one over the age of 16 has attained a high school diploma or
more education, those in that household are only flagged once. A ”Limited English
speaking household” is one in which no member 14 years old and over (1) speaks only
English at home or (2) speaks a language other than English at home and speaks English
”Very well.”
The result is an index that produces aggregate-level (tract, county, and state) small
area estimates: the CRE. The CRE provides an estimation of the total number of people
living in a community by the number of risk factors. The estimates are categorized into
three groups: 0 risk factors (Low risk), 1-2 risk factors (Medium risk), and three or more
risk factors (High risk). Individuals with three or more risk factors – from health and
income to age and living conditions – are considered high risk. Likewise, communities
are at high risk if at least 30% of their population has three or more risk factors.
Communities with more risk factors are considered less resilient to disasters and,
therefore, important to identify. By finding these counties, lawmakers can better allocate
resources and provide targeted help to the most needy. And this is especially important in
the recent pandemic of COVID-19. From the beginning of the pandemic, the adverse
effects of COVID-19 have been strongly affecting individuals and households. This tool
maps the risk assessment of local populations down to the neighborhood level and allows
national and community leaders to respond more efficiently to emergencies. In addition,
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stakeholders can use CRE and other tools to help combat the current crisis and plan for
future health and weather-related disasters.
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CHAPTER 4: HEALTH EFFECT
This chapter looks at the global conditions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
affected and death numbers of different countries due to other mortality methods, discuss
the new variants, vaccines, U.S. situation, and then focuses on Idaho number. The U.S.
health and risk factors levels are compared to the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths.
4.1

Global health effect

The COVID-19 pandemic makes up a global health shock, with an official death
toll of over 5.6 million and over 350 million people reported ill by January 23, 2022 [3].
Once the pandemic took hold, the world witnessed the devastating collapse of health
systems when the first wave of coronavirus attacked. There was so much chaos from the
beginning of this novel coronavirus, starting from denying the new virus attack, ignoring
the symptoms, finding an effective testing procedure, developing and choosing safe and
efficient vaccines from dozens of vaccines through clinical trials, how the virus spread
and fighting with new variants, which group of people gets affected most, whether masks,
lockdown, isolation and social distancing work, which vaccine to take, etc. The ultimate
impact of the pandemic directs people to uncertainty and ignorance, perplexing thinking,
and reflexive panic; on top of everything, unemployment, insufficient medical care, and
the misery of losing loved ones led worldwide people to protest against lockdowns,
vaccines, and government [45], [10], [7].
A question central to the COVID-19 pandemic is why the COVID-19 mortality
rate varies so greatly across countries. One reason is that COVID-19 testing methods
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differ from country to country. Another reason discovered recently is that the mortality
methods vary from one research approach to another. For example, the Lancet, a peerreviewed journal, measured the COVID-19 death number by excess mortality and found
that 18.2 million people may have died globally from COVID-19, three times the official
total, by December 2021 [43]. Another excess-mortality database maintained by The
Economist also estimates global excess mortality & puts the figure above 20.3 million
COVID-19 death (with 95% confidence interval) by March 27, 2022.
The numbers vary so broadly that accounting for them entirely changes the
picture of the experience of individual nations but the whole world, rearranging
everything about our gathered knowledge [1]. Based on the crude count of official death
reports, North America and Europe have death counts almost eight times as high as Asia
and 12 times as high as Africa. South America’s death toll is ten times as high as Asia
and 15 times as high as Africa. The excess-mortality data tells a different story. There is
still a clear continent-by-continent pattern, but the gaps between them are much smaller,
making the experiences of other parts of the world much less distinct and telling a
universal story about the devastation wrought by this once-in-a-century contagion. With
this view, Oceania, Europe, and North America were among the best at preventing deaths
among the old, and they were better at protecting their elderly than Africa and South
Asia. By almost any metric, Oceania does better, and the estimate of excess deaths
among the elderly in New Zealand is zero, according to The Economist. In the countryby-country data, the world’s worst pandemic, according to the data, has been in Bulgaria,
followed by Serbia, North Macedonia, and Russia, then Lithuania, Bosnia, Belarus,
Georgia, Romania, and Sudan [21], [43].
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The coronavirus has mutated through time and causes different variants. The delta
variant is considered one of the most contagious, causes severe illness, and the omicron is
more infectious [16]. Fortunately, vaccination effectively prevents serious illness,
hospitalization, and death from COVID-19. In the beginning, fewer people were
vaccinated, which meant many people were vulnerable [37]. Other factors have impacted
whether COVID-19 cases are increasing or declining in particular locations. These
factors include the effectiveness of vaccines over time, human behavior, infection
prevention policies, mutation of the virus, and the number of vulnerable people. We are
now in this overall stable situation after many trial and error procedures of our
government and health guidelines [41].
4.2

U.S. health and community resilience

Health includes physical, behavioral, social, and well-being, which is a big part of
overall resilience [44]. In many ways, health is a crucial foundation of resilience because
almost everything we do to prepare for disaster and protect infrastructure is ultimately in
the interest of preserving human health and welfare. In this pandemic, vaccines are
serving the primary purpose, which is to prevent severe illness, hospitalizations, and
death, critically reducing the load on the overburdened healthcare system, and overall
improving resilience [13]. Since the pandemic began, U.S. states and territories have used
different approaches to reporting data about COVID-19 cases, deaths, tests, and vaccines.
The lack of uniformity has complicated efforts to track COVID-19 in near real-time. As
of March 2022, 81.6 million COVID-19 cases and 1 million deaths have been reported,
and more than 45 million COVID-19 vaccine doses have been administered in the U.S.
[15], translating to 62% of the total population being fully vaccinated. The vast majority
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of individuals have access to a free vaccine. However, many have chosen not to accept
one.
Table 4.1

Death rates for US states

US States with highest COVID-19 death rate
Mississipi
Arizona
Alabama
US states with lowest COVID-19 death rate
Hawai
Vermont
Utah
COVID-19 death rate in Idaho

COVID-19 death rate per 100k
population
416.5
396.8
393.2
COVID-19 death rate per 100k
population
97
98.9
146.9

*till March 29, 2022
Table 4.2

274.9

Case rates for US states

US States with highest COVID-19 case rate
Rhode Island
Alaska
North Dakota
US states with lowest COVID-19 case rate
Oregon
Maryland
Hawaii
Total COVID-19 case rate in Idaho

COVID-19 case rate per 100k
population
34054
32590
31550
COVID-19 case rate per 100k
population
16823
1686
17183
24903

*till March 29, 2022
The COVID-19 death rate is the number of fatalities from the disease per 100,000
people. Table 4.1, presents states with the highest and lowest death rates. Furthermore,
Table 4.2 presents states with Rhode Island, Alaska, and North Dakota have the highest
and Oregon, Maryland, Hawaii have the lowest COVID-19 case rates. However, rates are
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not the best measure when comparing data. According to the World Health Organization,
”any attempt to capture a single measure of fatality in a population will fail to account for
the underlying heterogeneities between different risk groups, and the important bias that
occurs due to their different distributions within and between populations” [31]. For
instance, data shows COVID-19 death rate is higher among Latinos, Blacks, and
Indigenous Americans than among non-Hispanic whites, shown in Figure 4.1. Also, rural
counties are far more likely to have greater proportions of high-risk populations. Thirty
percent of all rural counties are high-risk compared to 14% of all urban counties. Some of
the factors associated with more high-risk communities include low income, especially in
rural communities, a greater proportion of single mothers, a majority Black and Hispanic
population, and a significant proportion of residents 65 and older are at considerable risk
for infection and developing severe illness.
Counties with at least 30% of their population with three or more risk factors are
considered high risk. The simple graph in Figure 4.2 shows the high risk counties of the
U.S., provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. According to the Bureau, the CRE data
indicates that Florida, Nevada, Texas, New York, New Mexico, and Arizona have a
significant percentage of high-risk populations; around 30% of their population is highly
vulnerable. For instance, Florida is the most at-risk state; 31% of the population is at high
risk. Followed by Nevada, New York, and Texas have the highest percentage of high risk
people. However, Texas has a significant number of high risk counties; for example, Real
County, Texas, has 47% of its population with high risk factors, making its population
vulnerable to pandemics. On the other hand, more than 60% of people in California and
Hawaii have 1 or 2 risk factors, which means most people are at medium risk. Vermont,
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New Hemisphere, and Maine have more than 30% of people having no or low risks,
pointing that they are less vulnerable to disaster. Countywise, Salt Lake County, Utah,
has 66% zero or low risk people, having the most community resilience in the entire
nation.

Figure 4.1

High risk communities of US by race, ethnicity majority
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4.3

COVID-19 and Idaho resilience data

The first case relating to the COVID-19 pandemic in Idaho was confirmed on
March 13, 2020, when a woman from Ada County tested positive, and Idaho’s first
COVID-19 deaths were on March 26 [39]. As of March 29, 2022, there have been
443,792 confirmed cases and 4,870 deaths within Idaho, while 930,380 people have been
fully vaccinated (not including booster doses). To compare with other states, on average,
counties in Idaho have 23% of its residents with high risk, 50% with medium risk, and
27% with low risk, see Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.2: Community resilience of US by Census Bureau
Figure 4.3 shows the community resilience estimates for the county-level state
profile for Idaho, sorted by the greatest percentage of residents in the county with three or
more risk factors to least. According to the CRE tool, Clearwater is a high risk county
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with 33% of its residents at high risk, following Washington and Idaho counties having
around 30% high risk people. In contrast, Teton County has 37% low risk people, being
the most resilient in Idaho. Franklin, Jefferson, and Butte counties also keep their risk
low. Madison, Jerome, Caribou, and Canyon counties have around 50% to 60% of
medium risk populations.
Looking at the percent of death cases in Idaho counties, Clark (43% at medium
risk) and Camas (54% at medium risk) counties have zero COVID-19 death cases, and
Lewis ( 44.15% at medium risk) and Shoshone (45% at medium risk) counties have the
highest percent of COVID-19 death cases, even though most people are at medium risk.
Table 4.3

Confirmed case rates for Idaho counties

Idaho counties with highest COVID-19
COVID-19 confirmed case rate per
confirmed case rate
100k population
Madison County
269.25
Lewis County
236.87
Clearwater County
229.9
Idaho counties with lowest COVID-19
COVID-19 confirmed case rate per
confirmed case rate
100k population
Camas County
99.37
Custer County
104.4
Clark County
110.3
*till March 29, 2022
Table 4.4

Idaho counties sorted by high risk

Greatest percentage of high
risk counties
Clearwater County
Washington County
Idaho County
Least percentage of high risk
counties
Latah County
Jefferson County
Caribou County

percentage of residents with high risk
32.56%
30.26%
29.68%
15%
16.63%
16.86%
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4.4

Summary

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic illuminated the fact that communities
respond differently to disasters. For example, greater engagement in health-promoting
behaviors may promote resilience in the face of infectious diseases like COVID-19 and
prevent chronic diseases, including respiratory disease and diabetes. All countries can
improve their readiness as we continue building a culture of preparedness. Collaborative
efforts of the government and community are crucial to the success of the response to and
recovery from public health emergencies and the resilience of a country. Because
community resilience research is an emerging field, the indicators and indices of disaster
resilience are sufficient with a wide range of tools that claim to measure disaster
resilience, and our concern is to verify the CRE tool in this case.

31

Figure 4.3

County-level community resilience estimates of Idaho
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CHAPTER 5: REGRESSION ANALYSIS
This chapter uses a simple linear regression model to quantify the relationship
between COVID-19 cases and deaths, released by the Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University [15], and the resilience indices CRE
tool from the U.S. Census Bureau CRE tool (census.gov). The COVID-19 data are
cumulative values from March 13, 2020, until January 17, 2022.
5.1

Simple Linear Regression

In this research, we choose simple linear regression analysis because it captures
the straightforward relationship between two variables. We will use it to determine if the
number of COVID-19 cases and deaths depend on Idaho counties risk factors.
Regression can be restrictive because it relies on a fixed set of parameters β0 and
β1 and assumes a linear relationship between variables, i.e., y =β0+β1x. An important

objective of simple linear regression analysis is to estimate the unknown parameters β0

(intercept) and β1 (slope) in the regression model. This process is called fitting the model
to the data. We use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method with our data to find
ˆ
ˆ
estimates of β0 and β1, denoted by β 0 and β 1 respectively.
To understand the effectiveness of the fitted linear model, we present summary
statistics available through the summary() command in R. These statistics give us detailed
information on the model’s performance and coefficients, including standard errors, tstatistics, p-values, and the F-test results. However, we usually cannot detect departures
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from the underlying assumptions in our model by examining the standard summary
statistics, such as t or F statistics or R2. These are global model properties, and as such,
they do not ensure model adequacy. Therefore, we also check the adequacy of our simple
linear model.
Regression analysis typically includes model adequacy checking, where the
appropriateness of the model is studied, and the quality of the fit is ascertained. Through
such analyses, the usefulness of the regression model may be determined. The outcome
of adequacy checking may indicate either the model is reasonable or that the original fit
must be modified. Thus, regression analysis is an iterative process in which data lead to a
model, and a model’s fit to the data is produced. A regression model does not imply a
cause-and-effect relationship between the variables. To establish the causality, the
relationship between the regressors and the response must have a basis outside the sample
data- for example, the relationship may be suggested by theoretical considerations.
Finally, it is crucial to remember that regression analysis is part of a broader data-analytic
approach to problem-solving. That is, the regression equation itself may not be the
primary objective of the study. Instead, it is usually more important to gain insight and
understanding concerning the system generating the data [26].
5.1.1 Assumptions of a simple linear regression model
If the following assumptions are validated, the simple linear model can acceptably
represent the data:
1. The relationship between the response y and the regressor x is linear.
ˆ ˆ
2. The residuals, or errors ε = yˆ−β 0−β 1x are normally distributed with zero
mean.
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3. The residuals have a constant variance.
4. The residuals are independent.
Therefore, our regression analysis involves assessing the validity of these
assumptions to understand the model’s adequacy. Model inadequacies have potentially
severe consequences. In particular, gross violations of the assumptions may yield an
unstable model in the sense that a different sample could lead to a totally different model
with opposite conclusions.
1. Linear relationship between x & y
The first assumption of linear regression is a linear relationship between the
independent variable, x, and the independent variable, y. The easiest way to detect this
assumption is to create a scatter plot of x vs. y. This allows us to visually see if there is a
linear relationship between the two variables. If it looks like the points in the plot could
fall along a straight line, then there exists some linear relationship between the two
variables, and this assumption is met. Here we run the regression equation and estimate
ˆ
the parameters β 0 and βˆ1.
After creating a scatter plot, if we see no linear association between the two
variables, there is some option to fix this. We can apply a nonlinear transformation to the
independent and/or dependent variable by taking the log, the square root, or other data
transformations. For example, if the plot of x vs. y has a quadratic shape, it might be
possible to add X2 as an additional independent variable in the model.
2. Residuals are Normally Distributed
The residuals play a key role in evaluating model adequacy. Residuals can be
viewed as the observed values of the model errors. To check the constant variance and
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uncorrelated errors assumption, we must first ask ourselves if the residuals look like a
random sample from a normal distribution with these properties. After estimating the
parameters, the residuals (e) are calculated as the difference between the observed value
(y) and the corresponding fitted values (ˆy); i.e., the ith residual is, ei = yi −yˆi = yi
ˆ ˆ
−(β 0+β 1xi). There are two common ways to check if the residuals are normal:

1. Check the assumption visually using Q-Q plots. If the points on the plot
roughly form a straight diagonal line, then the normality assumption is met.
2. Check assumptions using formal statistical tests like Shapiro-Wilk,
Kolmogorov Smirnov, Jarque-Barre, or D’Agostino-Pearson. However, these
tests are sensitive to large sample sizes – that is, they often conclude that the
residuals are not normal when the sample size is large. This is why it is often
easier to use graphical methods like a Q-Q plot to check this assumption.
However, small departures from the normality assumption do not affect the model

greatly, but gross non-normality is potentially more serious as the t or F statistics and
confidence and prediction intervals depend on the normality assumption. If the normality
assumption is violated, we have a few options:
•

Verify that any outliers are not significantly impacting the distribution. If
outliers are present, make sure that they are actual values, not some data entry
errors.

•

If the errors come from a distribution with thicker or heavier tails than the
normal, other estimation techniques should be considered, i.e., robust
regression methods.
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•

Apply a nonlinear transformation to the independent and/or dependent
variable. Common examples include taking the log, the square root, or the
reciprocal of the independent and/or dependent variable.

3. Residuals have constant variance
It is an assumption of linear regression that residuals have constant variance at
every level of fitted values ˆy, or homoscedasticity occurs. The simplest way to detect
non-constant variance is by creating a residual plot against a fitted value (ˆy) of the
model. If the plot resembles that the residuals can be contained in a horizontal band, then
there are no obvious model defects. This verifies the assumption that the residuals are
randomly distributed and have constant variance. When this is not the case, the residuals
are said to suffer from heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity indicates that the variance is
not constant or the true relationship between x and y is not linear.
There are some ways to fix heteroscedasticity:
•

Transform the regressor and/or response variable, i.e., apply log or inverse
tarnsformation.

•

Use weighted regression.

4. Residual terms are independent
The linear regression model assumes that residuals are independent. This is
relevant mainly when working with time-series data. However, as our data is not timeordered, this assumption check is unnecessary.
5.1.2 Lack of fit of the model
The formal statistical test for the lack of fit of a regression model assumes that the
normality, independence, and constant-variance requirements for residuals are met, and
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only the linear relationship assumption is in doubt. For example, if there is a linear
relationship between x and y, we say there is no lack of fit in the simple linear regression
model. Otherwise, the true relationship could be quadratic, for example. In this case, what
we claim to be a random error could be a systematic departure due to not fitting enough
terms. Data transformation of a new model is needed to fix these types of errors.
5.2

Analysis of community resilience data

Estimation and hypothesis testing are complementary inferential processes of a
regression model. A hypothesis test is used to determine whether or not a treatment has
an effect, while estimation is used to determine how much effect. For example, using the
Ordinary Least Squares Method (OLS), we estimate the parameter β1. Once we are done
with estimation, we need to do hypothesis testing to make inferences about the
ˆ
population. Thus, we would like to know how close β (estimated β) is to true β or how
ˆ
close the variance of β is to the true variance. If all assumptions of the linear regression
are satisfied, OLS gives us the best linear unbiased estimates. In this section, we estimate
the coefficient, test of hypothesis, and verify the assumptions of the linear model for six
individual cases.
The fitted simple linear regression model is:
yˆj,k(i)=β

ˆ

ˆ

0 j,k +β 1 j,kxk(i)

(5.1)

where, i represents a county in Idaho (i = 1,2,.....44), j represents number of confirmed

cases (j = 1) or confirmed deaths (j = 2) adjusted for population, k indicates low (k = 0),

medium (k = 1), or high (k = 2) risk factors. For example, Y1(i) represents percent of
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COVID-19 confirmed cases in Idaho County i, and X2(i) represents percent of individuals
with high risk factors. Values for Yj(i) were obtained from Johns Hopkins Coronavirus

Resource Center [3], while values for the independent variables Xk(i) were obtained from
the CRE tool offered by census.gov. The COVID-19 data are cumulative values from

March 13,2020 to March 29, 2022 during which time there has been over 500 million
confirmed cases and 6.2 million confirmed deaths in the entire state of Idaho.
5.2.1 Case I: confirmed cases vs. low risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with low-risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the percent of confirmed cases in
corresponding counties. Our goal is to find if there exists any linear relationship.
First, we created a scatter plot in Figure 5.1 by plotting the percentage of
individuals with low-risk factor x0(i) on the x-axis and the percent of confirmed covid

cases y1(i) on the y-axis. There are 44 points in this plot for 44 Idaho counties. The plot in

Figure 5.1 indicates a downhill pattern as we move from left to right, implying a negative
relationship between the percent of low risk people and the number of COVID-19 cases.
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Figure 5.1

Case I: COVID-19 confirmed cases vs low risk for 44 Idaho counties

We then use command lm() in R to fit linear models to data using OLS. The result
(Table 5.1) contains coefficients for ˆy1(i)=βˆ01,0+βˆ11,0x0(i), where βˆ01,0 is the x-intercept
and

ˆ 1,0

β1 is the slope. From this equation, we could interpret that for each unit increasing

rate of individuals with low-risk factors, the rate of confirmed cases decreased by
0.03442.
We use the following null and alternative hypotheses for this t-test:

H0 : β1 = 0

H1 : β1 ̸= 0.

Our t-statistic value is −2.147 from Table 5.1, and its corresponding p-value is

0.0376 (< significant level, α = 0.05). In practice, any p-value below 0.05 is usually

deemed as significant. From these results, we can conclude that there is strong evidence
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that the coefficients in this model are not zero, meaning there is a correlation between our
dependent and independent variable; however, the correlation is very weak. From Table
5.1, we see standard error (SE) 0.001603, which is close to zero. SE is an indication of
the reliability of the mean. This small SE is an indication that the sample mean is a more
accurate reflection of the actual population mean. The correlation coefficient is r =
−0.314 indicating the negative relation between the variables. The coefficient of

determination R2 = 0.090887 indicates a very weak correlation between our predicted and
predictor variables (see Table 5.7).
Table 5.1

Least Square Coefficients for case I
Estimate

ˆ 1,0 β0
ˆ 1,0 β1

0.2922
-0.00344

Std. Error

t value

0.043596

6.7

0.0016

(a) Q–Q plot of confirmed cases Y1(i)

Figure 5.2

-2.147

Pr (|> |t||)

3.86e-08
0.037

(b) Boxplot of confirmed cases Y1(i)

Normality and outliers of confirmed cases
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(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case I
Figure 5.3

(b) Residual vs. fitted plot for case I

Model adequacies of residuals for case I

Now we look at our response variable, confirmed cases Y1(i). Q–Q plot of the

response variable in Figure 5.2a shows that our confirmed cases are samples from a

normal distribution. The boxplot in Figure 5.2b gives us a visual representation of the
range and outliers of the confirmed cases. We get one outlier, Madison County, having
the highest percent of cumulative confirmed cases.
Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals to check for model adequacy.
To validate the normality check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here,
Fig 5.3a, which indicates the residual is from a normal distribution. Now we tested if
residuals have constant variance by plotting the residual vs. fitted values ˆy in Figure
5.3b. Here the pattern of dots is dense around the midline, but the red line deviates from
the midline for small and large values of y1. This reflects some extreme residuals
represented by 19 ( Custer County), 31 (Lewis County), and 33 (Madison County).
However, from the boxplot of our y1 in Figure 5.2b, we see the only significant outlier of
confirmed cases is Madison County. This residual plot indicates either the variance of the
residual may not be constant, or these counties are outliers.
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We could understand the situation better by applying suitable transformation on
the regressor and/or the response variable or the use of weighted least squares. These
experiments have been left for future work.
5.2.2 Case II: Confirmed cases vs. medium risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with medium risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the rate of confirmed cases in
corresponding counties. The scatter plot in Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of individuals
with medium risk factor x1(i) as the x-axis and the percent of confirmed Covid cases y1(i)
on the y-axis. The plot in Figure 5.4 indicates an uphill pattern as we move from left to

right, implying a positive relationship between the number of people in the medium risk
category and the number of confirmed cases.

Figure 5.4

Case II: confirmed cases vs medium risk for 44 Idaho counties
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We see in Table 5.2 for this case that the rate of confirmed cases increased by
0.003775 for each unit, increasing the rate of individuals with medium-risk factors. Our tstatistic value is 2.456 and its corresponding p-value is 0.018. We see standard error
0.0015, which is close to zero, indicating the reliability of the mean. From these results,
we can conclude that there is strong evidence that the coefficients in this model are not
zero, meaning there is a correlation between our dependent and independent variable;
however, the correlation is very weak. The positive sign of the correlation coefficient r =
0.354 indicates the positive relation. The coefficient of determination (R2 = 0.125)
indicates a very weak correlation between our predicted and predictor variables.

The Q–Q plot of the response variable confirmed cases Y1(i) is given in Figure

5.2a. The plot indicates that our confirmed cases are samples from a normal distribution.
The boxplot in Figure 5.2b is of one outlier, Madison County, having the highest percent
of cumulative confirmed cases.

Table 5.2

Ordinary Least Square coefficients for case II
Estimate

ˆ 1,1 β0
ˆ 1,1 β1

Std. Error

t value

0.0107

0.0771

0.139

Pr (|> |t||)

0.0037

0.0015

2.456

0.018

0.889
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(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case II

Figure 5.5

(b) residual vs. fitted plot for case II

Model adequacies of residuals for case II

Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals. To validate the normality
check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here, Fig 5.5a, which indicates
the residual is from a normal distribution. We tested if residuals have constant variance
by plotting the residual vs. fitted values ˆy in Figure 5.5b. Here the pattern of dots is
dense around the midline, but the red line deviates from the midline for large and small
values for y, as in case I. In this case, some extreme residuals are 13 (Camas County), 18
(Clearwater County), and 31 (Lewis County). However, from the boxplot of our y1 in
Figure 5.2b, we see the significant outlier of confirmed cases is Madison County. Again
we conclude the variance of the residual is not constant, or these counties are considered
outliers, and future work indicates applying transformation or weighted least squares.
5.2.3 Case III: Confirmed cases vs. high risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with high-risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the rate of confirmed cases in
corresponding counties. The scatter plot in Fig 5.6 shows the percentage of individuals
with high-risk factor x2(i) as the x-axis and the percent of confirmed Covid cases y1(i) on
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the y-axis. Unfortunately, the plot in Fig 5.6 does not indicate any significant pattern as
we move from left to right; we have to look at the summary statistics for further
information.

Figure 5.6

Case III: confirmed cases vs high risk for 44 Idaho counties

We see in Table 5.3 for this case that the rate of confirmed cases decreased by
0.000553 for each unit, increasing rate of individuals with high-risk factors. Our t-statistic
value is −0.326 and its corresponding p-value is 0.746. we see standard error 0.0016,

which is very small, indicating the reliability of the mean. From these results, we can
conclude that there is insufficient evidence of a correlation between our dependent and
independent variables. The positive sign of the correlation coefficient r = −0.05 indicates
the positive relation. The coefficient of determination R2 = 0.0025 indicates a very weak

correlation between our predicted and predictor variables.
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(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case III

Figure 5.7

(b) residual vs. fitted plot for case III

Model adequacies of residuals for case III

The Q–Q plot of the response variable is given in Figure 5.2a. The plot indicates
that our confirmed cases are samples from a normal distribution. The boxplot in Figure
5.2b is of one outlier, Madison County, having the highest percent of cumulative
confirmed cases.
Table 5.3

Least Square Coefficients for case III
Estimate

ˆ 1,2 β0
ˆ 1,2 β1

0.2124
-0.0005

Std. Error

t value

0.0396

5.364

Pr (|> |t||)

0.0016

-0.326

0.746

0.0000032

Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals. To validate the normality
check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here, Fig 5.7a, which indicates
the residual is from a normal distribution. We tested if residuals have constant variance
by plotting the residual vs. fitted values ˆy in Figure 5.7b. Here the pattern of dots is
dense around the midline, but the red line deviates from the midline for large and small
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values for y1 as in case I. In this case, some extreme residuals are numbers 13 (Camas
County), 31 (Lewis County), and 33 (Madison County). However, from the boxplot of
our y1 in Figure 5.2b, we see the significant outlier of confirmed cases is Madison
County. Again we conclude the variance of the residual is not constant, or these counties
are considered outliers, and future work indicates applying transformation or weighted
lease squares.
5.2.4 Case IV: Confirmed deaths vs. low risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with low-risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the percent of confirmed deaths in
corresponding counties. The scatter plot in Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of individuals
with low-risk factor x0(i) as the x-axis and the percent of confirmed deaths y2(i) on the yaxis. The plot in Figure 5.8 indicates a downhill pattern as we move from left to right,
implying a negative relationship between the number of people in the medium risk
category and the number of confirmed deaths.

Figure 5.8

Case IV: confirmed deaths vs low risk for 44 Idaho counties
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(a) Q–Q plot of confirmed deaths Y2(i)

Figure 5.9

(b) Boxplot of confirmed deaths Y2(i)

Pattern and outliers of confirmed deaths

We see in Table 5.4 for this case that the rate of confirmed deaths decreased by
−8.055e− 05 for each unit, increasing the rate of individuals with low-risk factors. Our tstatistic value is −1.582 and its corresponding p-value is 0.121. We see standard error

0.00005. SE is close to zero, indicating that the sample mean accurately reflects the actual
population mean. The negative sign of the correlation coefficient r = −0.237 indicates the

negative relation. The coefficient of determination R2 = 0.056 indicates that if there exists

any linear relationship between our predicted and predictor variable, it is very weak.
From these results, we can conclude that there is no solid evidence to conclude a
correlation between our dependent and independent variable.

The Q–Q plot of the response variable confirmed deaths Y2(i) is given in Figure

5.9a. The plot indicates departure from a normal distribution. The boxplot in Figure 5.9b
is of two outliers, Shoshone County and Lewis County, having the highest percent of
cumulative confirmed deaths.
Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals. To validate the normality
check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here, Fig 5.10a, which
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indicates the residual is from a normal distribution. We tested if residuals have constant
variance by plotting the residual plot in figure 5.10b. Here the pattern of dots is dense
around the midline, but the red line deviates from the midline for large and small values
for y2.

Table 5.4

Least Square Coefficients for case IV
Estimate

ˆ 2,0 β0
ˆ 2,0 β1

5.2e-03
-8.05e-05

Std. Error
1.38e-03
5.09e-05

(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case IV

Figure 5.10

t value
3.76
-1.582

Pr (|> |t||)

0.0005
0.121

(b) residual vs. fitted plot for case IV

Model adequacies of residuals for case IV

In this case, some extreme residuals are 31 (Lewis county), 33 (Madison County),
and 40 (Shoshone County). However, from the boxplot of our y2 in Figure 5.9b, we see
the significant outliers of confirmed deaths are Shoshone and Lewis County. Again we
conclude the variance of the residual is not constant, or these counties are considered
outliers and our future work indicates applying transformation or weighted least squares.

50
5.2.5 Case V: confirmed deaths vs. medium risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with medium-risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the rate of confirmed deaths in
corresponding counties. The scatter plot in Figure 5.11 shows the percentage of
individuals with medium risk factor x1(i) as the x-axis and the percent of confirmed

deaths y2(i) on the y-axis. The plot in Figure 5.11 indicates a downhill pattern as we

move from left to right, implying a negative relationship between the number of people in
the medium risk category and the number of confirmed deaths.

Figure 5.11

Case V: confirmed deaths vs medium risk for 44 Idaho counties

We see in Table 5.5 for this case that the rate of confirmed deaths decreased by
0.00009097 for each unit, increasing the rate of individuals with medium-risk factors.
Our t-statistic value is −1.855, and its corresponding p-value is 0.07. We see the standard

error is 0.000049, which is very small. The small SE value indicates that the sample mean
is a more accurate reflection of the actual population mean. From these results, we can
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conclude that there is no solid evidence to conclude a correlation between our dependent
and independent variable. The negative sign of the correlation coefficient r = −0.275

indicates the negative relation. The coefficient of determination R2 = 0.075 indicates a
very weak correlation between our predicted and predictor variables.

(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case V

Figure 5.12

(b) residual vs. fitted plot for case V

Model adequacies of residuals for case V

The Q–Q plot of the response variable confirmed cases y2(i) is given in Figure

5.9a. The boxplot in Figure 5.9b gives us two outliers, Shoshone County and Lewis
County, having the highest percent of cumulative confirmed deaths.
Table 5.5

Least Square Coefficients for case V
Estimate

ˆ 2,1 β0
ˆ 2,1 β1

Std. Error

t value

7.6e-03

2.4e-03

3.089

Pr (|> |t||)

-9.097e-05

4.9e-05

-1.855

0.07

0.0035

Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals. To validate the normality
check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here, Fig 5.12a, which
indicates the residual is from a normal distribution.
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We tested if residuals have constant variance by plotting the residual vs. fitted
values yˆ in Figure 5.12b. Here the pattern of dots is dense around the midline, But the
red line deviates from the midline for some small and large values for y2. In this case,
some extreme residuals are 17 (Clark County), 31 (Lewis County), and 41 (Teton
County). However, from the boxplot of y2 in Figure 5.9b, we see the significant outliers
of confirmed deaths are Lewis and Shoshone County. Again we conclude the variance of
the residual is not constant, or these counties are considered outliers and our future work
indicates applying transformation or weighted least squares.
5.2.6 Case VI: Confirmed deaths vs. high risk in Idaho counties
In this case, our predictor variable is the percent of individuals with high-risk
factors in Idaho counties, and the response variable is the rate of confirmed deaths in
corresponding counties. The scatter plot in Figure 5.13 shows the percentage of
individuals with high-risk factor x2(i) as the x-axis and the percent of confirmed Covid

deaths y2(i) on the y-axis. The plot in Figure 5.13 indicates an uphill pattern as we move
from left to right, implying a positive relationship between the number of people in the
high risk category and the number of confirmed deaths.
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Figure 5.13

Case VI: confirmed deaths vs high risk for 44 Idaho counties

We see in Table 5.2 for this case that the rate of confirmed deaths increased by
0.00017 for each unit, increasing the rate of individuals with high-risk factors. Our tstatistic value is 3.96 and its corresponding p-value is 0.00027. We see standard error
0.0000448, which indicates that the sample mean accurately reflects the actual population
mean. From these results, we can conclude that there is strong evidence that the
coefficients in this model are not zero, meaning there is a correlation between our
dependent and independent variable; however, the correlation is very weak. The positive
sign of the correlation coefficient r = 0.522 indicates the positive relation. The coefficient
of determination R2= 0.272 indicates a very weak correlation between our predicted and
predictor variables.

The Q–Q plot of the response variable is given in Figure 5.9a. The boxplot in
Figure 5.9b is of two outliers, Shoshone County and Lewis County, having the highest
percent of cumulative confirmed deaths.
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Table 5.6

Least Square Coefficients for case VI
Estimate

ˆ 2,2 β0

-1.051e-03

ˆ 2,2 β1

1.78e-04

Std. Error

t value

1.05e-03

-1.002

4.48e-05

3.966

Pr (|> |t||)

0.322

0.00027

Lastly, we verify the assumptions for the residuals. To validate the normality
check for residual, we look at the Q–Q plot of our residual here, Figure 5.14a, which
indicates the residual is from a normal distribution. We tested if residuals have constant
variance by plotting the residual vs. fitted values ˆy in Figure 5.14b. Here the pattern of
dots is dense around the midline, but the red line deviates from the midline for large and
small values for y. In this case, some extreme residuals are 17 (Clark County), 19 (Custer
County), and 31 (Lewis County). However, from the boxplot of our y2 in Figure 5.9b, we
see the significant outliers of the confirmed deaths are Lewis and Shoshone County.
Again we conclude the variance of the residual is not constant, or these counties are
considered outliers and our future work indicates applying transformation or weighted
least squares.

(a) Q-Q plot for residual in case VI

Figure 5.14

(b) residual vs. fitted plot for case VI

Model adequacies of residuals for case VI
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5.3

Discussion

P-values and correlation coefficients in regression analysis tell us which
relationships in our model are statistically significant and the nature of those
relationships. The coefficients describe the mathematical relationship between
independent and dependent variables for six cases. The p-values help determine whether
the relationships that we observe in the sample also exist in the population. Table 5.7
summarizes view of the linear relationship between our predicted and predictor variables.
From Table 5.7 we can see that for the case I, the significant p-value gives us
evidence of a relationship between the number of cases and those in low risk categories,
and a weak and negative correlation exists. For case II, the p-value is significant, and
there exists a weak correlation between a number of cases and those in medium risk
categories. For case III, the p-value is not significant, and a negligible correlation exists
between a number of cases and those in high risk categories. For case IV, the p-value is
not significant, as well as a negligible correlation exists between the number of deaths
and those in low risk categories. For case V, the p-value is not significant, and a
negligible correlation exists between the number of deaths and those in medium risk
categories. For case VI, the p-value is significant, and there is a moderate positive
correlation between the number of deaths and those in high-risk categories.
We also checked the model adequacy. All of the cases show negligence or weak
relationship between variables. Also, cases III, IV, and V give us some insignificant
results. We ran the same analysis excluding outliers we find from y1 and y2 and verified
that the outliers are not significantly impacting the distributions. Furthermore, we are
inconclusive if our variance of residual is constant in each case.
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Table 5.7
Cases
I
II
III
IV
V
VI

Correlation Coefficients and p-values for six cases
Correlation Coefficient, r
-0.3144
0.354
-0.237
-0.2768076
-0.2267045
0.522

p-values(< 0.05)
0.037
0.018
0.121
0.07
0.1389
0.000279
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As the world is diverse, its community characteristics are discrete, and people are
vulnerable to different factors depending on geography, race, ethnicity, etc. Thus,
identifying a worldwide community resilience that could apply to multiple hazards is
difficult to measure. But understanding the overall structural environment of global,
regional, and local community resilience is crucial for public health strategies. Severity
and frequency of a hazard, numbers of people and assets exposed to the hazard, and their
vulnerability are some components of disaster risk. Reducing vulnerability is one of the
most effective ways to reduce disaster risk.
After analyzing the current list of community resilience indicators, we choose to
work with CRE tool. CRE tool designates at-risk populations by determining if a person
has three or more factors, that make them particularly vulnerable. This available data
giving insight on vulnerability, which is important for emergency management
organizations. The CRE can help determine outreach services, the number and type of
personnel to deploy, and disaster assistance programs that can be activated to aid affected
areas. CRE also provides insight into a community’s capacity to recover from a disaster
like tornadoes, flooding and severe storm. However, our analysis shows that this metric is
not very compatible with the COVID-19 John Hopkins data.
On the other hand, COVID-19 pandemic creates a multidimensional crisis,
affecting different socioeconomic group and environmental area in different way.
Unfortunately, Covid-19 has a more significant impact on poor areas. Poverty is both a
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driver and a consequence of disaster risk because economic pressures force people to live
in unsafe conditions. Thus income-to-poverty ratio, crowded house, and full-time yearround employment are most likely relatable/significant indicators for COVID-19.
It is difficult to estimate the actual effect of the pandemic due to several reasons.
Early in the pandemic, people who died of COVID-19 may not have been recognized
because of inadequate knowledge of the symptom or lack of testing availability. Many
people who die while infected with COVID-19 are never tested for it and do not enter the
official totals. Some countries and organizations choose to hide the true toll of COVID19 due to political or other issues. Conversely, some people whose deaths have been
attributed to COVID-19 had other ailments that might have ended their lives in a similar
timeframe anyway.
There are different methods to count the fatality rate, i.e., crude mortality rate,
case fatality rate, infection fatality rate, and excess death rate. Various organizations
follow different methods; thus, the results vary. Also, modeling epidemiologic years
instead of calendar years would reduce the excess deaths estimate.
Rural and urban areas vary by the health infrastructure/number of hospitals and
health services, and these could also influence the rate of COVID-19 cases and deaths.
The health and safety between urban counties (9) and rural counties (35) in Idaho are not
equal. The residents of rural and underserved areas tend to experience higher rates of
poverty, lower per capita income, and distant from hospitals, as compared to their urban
counterparts, thus more exposed to vulnerability [29]. For example, Washington County
is showing high risk and having a greater number of confirmed death rate. Also,
misinformation and poor communication disproportionally affect individuals with less
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access to information channels. These people are therefore more likely to ignore
government health warnings.
Sample size affects the generalizability of the results. It is a genuine problem
because a small sample size is associated with low statistical power. In this research, we
are dealing with only 44 counties, and it is hard to get any kind of meaningful result from
these few data points. And this could also applicable when dealing with small populations
of the counties. For example, Lewis County shows outliers in both confirmed and death
cases and its population size (3864) is relatively small compared to other counties. So,
small sample size effect may affect Lewis County.
Our analysis did not get an enough correlation between the CRE tool and
COVID-19 cases and deaths to use the data for further estimations and predictions.
Residual vs. fitted plots of a few cases show heteroscedasticity may occur, but graphs and
plots are very subjective. We ran the analysis with and without outliers, which did not
create a huge difference. At the same time, we do not have enough logic to delete the
COVID-19 variables just because the rates are high, as these are the true values from
reliable sources. Also, we stopped updating our COVID-19 data on March 29, 2022, for
our research analysis. There is a possibility that the future data could give a better
relationship for our variables.
The CRE tool is the weighted aggregate of the ten risk factors. All these ten
factors get equal importance in this measure, but in reality, some risk factors are more
vulnerable than others. For example, age is a significant factor in this pandemic
compared to households without internet access. This tool could be more useful if the
data of the ten risk factors were available alongside with this CRE data, we could look at
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the separate risk factors as separate indicators. These individual indicators can
recommend to which resources be directed, according to the reality of each county.
Motivation behind this aggregate-level metric need further explanation. Overcoming
these limitations could serve a better analysis and help us predict and create a resilient
community during hazards and disasters.
For future research, there are several options available.
•

Deleting the outlier and performing the same analysis to find a better
relationship between the variables. However, strong reasoning is needed to
delete the variables in this case.

•

Performing data transformation, redefining dependent variables to remove
heteroscedasticity for each case, and running the analysis to get a better
relationship between variables.

•

If there is no strong correlation, chances are there are non-linear models. Here,
fitting different non-linear models to different cases can be a solution.
However, these need a lot of trial-and-error processes.

•

Confirmed deaths (Y2) showing departure from normal distribution. Usually,
this could happen for 2 reasons,
1. Our dependent variable confirmed deaths come from a non-normal
distribution.
2. Existence of a few outliers or extreme values which disrupt the model
prediction.
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In this case, several normality tests are there to run, for example, Shapiro-Wilk test,
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
•

Run Logistic Model instead of simple linear regression, for each case.

•

Research the indicators further and improve the method.

•

Analyze other community resilience indicators to get the best fit for COVID19 data.
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APPENDIX A
List of Counties with Covid-19 Confirmed Cases
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No.

County Name

Population

13
19
17
8
4
30
2
11
21
32
36
22
29
34
25
24
12
37
9
39
16
23
40
26
15
6
27
5
35
20
43
44
38
7
41
42
28
3
1

Camas County
Custer County
Clark County
Boise County
Bear Lake County
Lemhi County
Adams County
Boundary County
Franklin County
Lincoln County
Oneida County
Fremont County
Latah County
Minidoka County
Idaho County
Gooding County
Butte County
Owyhee County
Bonner County
Power County
Cassia County
Gem County
Shoshone County
Jefferson County
Caribou County
Bingham County
Jerome County
Benewah County
Nez Perce County
Elmore County
Valley County
Washington County
Payette County
Blaine County
Teton County
Twin Falls County
Kootenai County
Bannock County
Ada County

1127
4271
852
7600
6050
7949
4231
11928
13713
5360
4488
12751
37379
20816
16105
15153
2609
11614
44625
7748
23730
17581
12736
29359
7009
46114
23956
9217
39879
27122
11002
10117
23496
22601
11640
85624
160924
85629
461076

Low
Risk
29.46
24.61
32.16
26.95
30.30
24.15
20.28
28.60
35.34
24.68
30.35
29.04
32.78
27.45
22.78
23.39
32.85
26.85
26.97
26.20
23.99
27.67
26.65
34.18
25.31
28.97
20.85
24.06
29.28
26.58
26.29
23.40
27.15
28.26
36.97
23.51
27.15
26.97
26.61

Medium
Risk
53.59
46.24
42.84
48.28
49.47
46.89
51.29
46.17
46.69
50.47
48.48
48.54
52.22
49.27
47.54
52.72
47.68
50.28
50.13
52.98
52.03
45.59
45.76
49.20
57.83
48.18
57.97
50.46
47.82
53.49
49.87
46.35
51.02
50.41
43.31
51.21
51.67
51.09
54.17

High
Risk
16.95
29.15
25.00
24.78
20.23
28.96
28.43
25.23
17.98
24.85
21.17
22.42
15.01
23.28
29.68
23.88
19.47
22.88
22.90
20.82
23.97
26.74
27.59
16.63
16.86
22.86
21.18
25.47
22.90
19.93
23.84
30.26
21.83
21.32
19.73
25.28
21.18
21.94
19.22

Percent
of
confirmed cases
0.1153505
0.1203465
0.1255869
0.1335526
0.1484298
0.1557429
0.1567005
0.1656606
0.1680158
0.1684701
0.1733512
0.1735550
0.1749646
0.1757302
0.1782676
0.1791724
0.1809122
0.1831410
0.1840672
0.1862416
0.1904762
0.1975428
0.1985710
0.2003134
0.2080183
0.208852
0.2112623
0.2128675
0.2178089
0.2204483
0.2206871
0.2207176
0.2219527
0.2237954
0.2281787
0.231523
0.237174
0.2385056
0.2496465
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14
10
18
31
33

Canyon County
Bonneville County
Clearwater County
Lewis County
Madison County

221400
116497
8086
3846
38730

21.23
25.68
21.88
28.16
17.63

55.67
53.21
45.56
44.15
64.42

23.10
21.11
32.56
27.69
17.94

0.13930894
0.2582114
0.2687361
0.2888716
0.3215337
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No.

County Name

Population

41
17
29
33
7
43
8
13
19
21
22
1
16
26
10
36
4
20
39
27
32
3
34
14
30
25
6
42
12
2
15
38
24
28
35
9
18
5
37

Teton County
Clark County
Latah County
Madison County
Blaine County
Valley County
Boise County
Camas County
Custer County
Franklin County
Fremont County
Ada County
Cassia County
Jefferson County
Bonneville County
Oneida County
Bear Lake County
Elmore County
Power County
Jerome County
Lincoln County
Bannock County
Minidoka County
Canyon County
Lemhi County
Idaho County
Bingham County
Twin Falls County
Butte County
Adams County
Caribou County
Payette County
Gooding County
Kootenai County
Nez Perce County
Bonner County
Clearwater County
Benewah County
Owyhee County

11640
852
37379
38730
22601
11002
7600
1127
4271
13713
12751
461076
23730
29359
116497
4488
6050
27122
7748
23956
5360
85629
20816
221400
7949
16105
46114
85624
2609
4231
7009
23496
15153
160924
39879
44625
8086
9217
11614

Low
Risk
36.97
32.16
32.78
17.63
28.26
26.29
26.95
29.46
24.61
35.34
29.04
26.61
23.99
34.18
25.68
30.35
30.30
26.58
26.20
20.85
24.68
26.97
27.45
21.23
24.15
22.78
28.97
23.51
32.85
20.28
25.31
27.15
23.39
27.15
29.28
26.97
21.88
24.06
26.85

Medium
Risk
43.31
42.84
52.22
64.42
50.41
49.87
48.28
53.59
46.24
46.69
48.54
54.17
52.03
49.20
53.21
48.48
49.47
53.49
52.98
57.97
50.47
51.09
49.27
55.67
46.89
47.54
48.18
51.21
47.68
51.29
57.83
51.02
52.72
51.67
47.82
50.13
45.56
50.46
50.28

High
Risk
19.73
25.00
15.01
17.94
21.32
23.84
24.78
16.95
29.15
17.98
22.42
19.22
23.97
16.63
21.11
21.17
20.23
19.93
20.82
21.18
24.85
21.94
23.28
23.10
28.96
29.68
22.86
25.28
19.47
28.43
16.86
21.83
23.88
21.18
22.90
22.90
32.56
25.47
22.88

Percent
of
confirmed deaths
0.0006872852
0.0011737089
0.0012841435
0.0012909889
0.0013273749
0.0014542810
0.0017105263
0.0017746229
0.0021072348
0.0021147816
0.002117481
0.0021861906
0.0021913190
0.0022139719
0.0024378310
0.0024509804
0.0024793388
0.00258093
0.0025813113
0.0026715645
0.0027985075
0.0028845368
0.0029784781
0.0030578139
0.0031450497
0.0031667184
0.0033178644
0.0033752219
0.0034495975
0.0035452612
0.0035668426
0.0036176370
0.0036296443
0.0036414705
0.0036861506
0.0040784314
0.0040811279
0.0044483021
0.0044773549

73
23
11
44
40
31

Gem County
Boundary County
Washington County
Shoshone County
Lewis County

17581
11928
10117
12736
3846

27.67
28.60
23.40
26.65
28.16

45.59
46.17
46.35
45.76
44.15

26.74
25.23
30.26
27.59
27.69

0.0044934873
0.0049463447
0.0056340812
0.0058888191
0.0075403016
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Terms for COVID-19 data:
Confirmed Cases: Confirmed cases are counts of individuals whose coronavirus
infections were confirmed by a laboratory test and reported by a federal, state, territorial or local
government agency. Only tests that detect viral RNA in a sample are considered confirmatory.
These are often called molecular or RT-PCR tests [3].
Confirmed Deaths: Confirmed deaths are individuals who have died and meet the
definition for a confirmed COVID-19 case. Some states reconcile these records with death
certificates to remove deaths from their count where COVID-19 is not listed as the cause of
death. We follow health departments in removing non-COVID-19 deaths among confirmed cases
when we have information to unambiguously know the deaths were not due to COVID-19, i.e. in
cases of homicide, suicide, car crash or drug overdose [3].
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Source

Description

Level

JHU

Johns Hopkins University CSSE

Global County/State, United States

CTP

The COVID Tracking Project

State, United States

NYC

New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene

ZCTA/Borough, New York City

NYT

The New York Times

County/State, United States

UVA

University of Virginia School of Medicine

Municipality/State, South America

SES

Monitoring COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in
Brazil

Municipality/State/Country, Brazil

DPC

Italian Civil Protection Department

NUTS 0-3, Italy

RKI

Robert Koch-Institut, Germany

NUTS 0-3, Germany

JRC

Joint Research Centre

Global NUTS 0-3, Europe

ERA5

The fifth generation of ECMWF reanalysis

All levels

NLDAS

North American Land Data Assimilation
System

County/State, United States

CIESIN

C. for International Earth Science
Information Net.

Global gridded population

OxCGRT

Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker

National (global) subnational (US, UK)

CRC

Johns Hopkins Centers for Civic Impact

National (global) subnational (US)

IHME

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation

National (global) subnational (US)

